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WHERE TAX REFORM WENT ASTRAY
CHARLES E. MCLURE,

JR.t

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

M UCH has happened between the time this paper was written
I
in February 1986 and the time final revisions for publication
were begun in late June, shortly after Senate passage of tax reform by a vote of ninety-seven to three. In particular, tax reform
was taken to the very brink of disaster by Senatorial kowtowing to
special interests, before being salvaged by a bold proposal to
eliminate most tax shelters and reduce tax rates substantially, ostensibly to 15% and 27%.1 (The phase-out of the benefits of the
15% rate and personal exemptions as adjusted gross income rises
above $75,000 produces a top marginal rate of 32% over most of
the phase-out range.) As a result, some may think that the title of
the paper should be changed (at least by inserting the word "almost"), and much of the text, as originally written, may seem
dated.
Even so, I have not found it necessary to substantially rewrite
the paper to take account of Senate action on tax reform, or to
even change its title. To do so would produce an inaccurate record of the conference proceedings, as well as require an inordinate amount of time. More important, even if tax reform follows
the general contours of the House and Senate bills, in some combination, truly fundamental tax reform will have gone astray in
important respects. I have added a postscript in which I reflect
briefly on events of the past few months.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In late November of 1984, the United States Treasury Department submitted proposals for fundamental tax reform to
t Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution at Stanford University. From October
1983 throughJuly 1985 the author was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Analysis. He had primary responsibility for development of the
Treasury Department's tax reform proposals to President Reagan (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1984), which became the basis of THE PRESIDENT'S TAX
PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY (1985).

He has benefitted from comments by Ronald Pearlman on an earlier draft. The
views expressed here are, however, solely his own.
1. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986).
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President Reagan (the proposals are hereinafter called Treasury
I).2 Just over a year later, the House of Representatives passed
H.R. 3838, 3 the Tax Reform Act of 1985. Although H.R. 3838
contains a large number of proposed reforms which are worth enacting, it does not constitute fundamental tax reform. 4 Rather, it
is more accurately characterized as a lineal descendent of the
Democratic base-broadening efforts enshrined in the tax reform
acts of 1969 and 1976, with enough of the kind of rate reductions-at least for individuals-found in the 1964 and 1981 acts
to make the package politically palatable, if not popular. Because
the current reform effort is constrained to be revenue neutral, the
reduction in taxes for individuals is financed by substantial increases in taxes imposed on corporations. Much of this corporate
increase comes from sectors which have historically used preferential tax treatment designed specifically to allow them to pay little or no taxes. A substantial portion of the increase in corporate
liabilities results from the reduction of investment incentives (via
accelerated depreciation and the investment tax credit) enacted in
198 1.5
Legislative action now moves to the Senate, where the majority hopes to modify the House bill. Republicans will attempt to
increase incentives for investment, reduce the shift of tax burden
from individuals to corporations, and increase to $2,000 the personal exemptions for taxpayers who itemize, as well as for those
who do not itemize. There are indications that President Reagan
assured House Republicans that he would veto any bill coming
2.

UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,

TAX

REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIM-

PLICITY AND ECON. GROWTH, THE TREASURY DEP'T REP. TO THE PRESIDENT (1984)

[hereinafter cited as TREASURY I].
3. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H12434 (daily ed. Dec.
17, 1985).
4. See id. It should be noted that all references to H.R. 3838 are to the bill
passed by the House of Representatives in December 1985, not to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
5. For example, of the $139 billion proposed net increase in corporate
taxes over the 1986-1990 period, $60 billion comes from "accounting provisions," $7 billion results from increases in taxes on financial institutions, insurance products and companies provide an additional $10 billion, and changes in
"corporate provisions" produce another $11 billion, for a total of $88 billion.
By comparison, "capital income provisions" account for an increase in corporate
taxes of $119 billion. Of this amount, repeal of the investment tax credit, by
itself, accounts for $98 billion. If the benefits of corporate provisions that reduce liabilities by $86 billion are added to the net increase of $139 billion, the
gross increase is $225 billion. The $88 billion increase in the four categories
listed in the first sentence above represents almost 40% of this gross increase in
corporate tax liabilities. See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 62-77
(1985).
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out of a House-Senate conference that is not more favorable to
investment than is H.R. 3838. However, many informed observers believe that the President will sign any tax reform bill that
comes to his desk, as long as the top marginal rate is no higher
than approximately 35% to 38%.
It appears quite unlikely that a conference bill will differ substantially from H.R. 3838. This is because the only way to avoid
the shift in liabilities from individuals to corporations and restore
a $2,000 personal exemption for all taxpayers would be to eliminate the deduction for state and local taxes or find a new source
of revenue, such as a value-added tax. While both of these options have been discussed, neither seems likely to have substantial
support in the Senate. It thus seems safe to believe that the
United States may soon enact a tax law patterned after H.R. 3838.
Several models exist for idealized systems of direct taxation.
Like most tax reform proposals, H.R. 3838 differs substantially
from all of these. The purpose of this paper is to describe and
discuss these deviations. 6 Section II describes briefly several idealized systems with which H.R. 3838 and other tax reform proposals can be compared. It notes that Treasury I, the Treasury
Department's November 1984 proposals to President Reagan,
had already deviated from these conceptual ideals in several important respects. Even so, the Treasury I proposals are generally
recognized as a far-reaching attempt to introduce a truly comprehensive income tax that would have provided fundamental tax
reform.
Section III discusses the question of the best strategy to use
in attempting to gain fundamental tax reform. Some observers of
the legislative process argue that fundamental tax reform is impossible, or at best, can be achieved only incrementally. By comparison, Treasury I and its derivatives were based on the view that
fundamental reform was possible, but could only be achieved if
presented as an all-or-nothing proposition. Thus, Treasury I reflected a strategic decision that fundamental tax reform would be
feasible only if virtually all forms of preferential treatment were
eliminated simultaneously in order to achieve substantial and visible benefits of rate reduction, fairness, neutrality, and simplification. Also discussed in Section III are the difficulties of
6. This paper deals only with direct taxation, that is, taxes levied on the
income or consumption of individuals and the profits of business. It does not
consider indirect taxes, such as retail sales taxes, value-added taxes, and other
forms of transaction-based taxes on consumption. For an analysis of such taxes,
see McLure, The Value-Added Tax: Key To Deficit Reduction? (forthcoming).
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formulating proposals for fundamental tax reform in the politically-charged environment of an election year, the role of transition rules in facilitating acceptance of tax reform, the importance
of revenue neutrality and distributional neutrality in the formulation of Treasury I, and the political importance of where one starts
in determining the acceptable contours of tax reform.
Section IV describes in greater detail the outline and defects
(both real and imagined) of the Treasury I proposals. The outline
provides a benchmark against which the President's proposals
and H.R. 3838 can be examined. A major defect of Treasury I was
its failure to eliminate the preferential treatment of owner-occupied housing. Treasury I also exhibited a few technical defects that
rendered it vulnerable to political attack. Probably more important, Treasury I suffered from innumerable cosmetic difficulties
which hurt it politically.
Whereas the Treasury I proposals took the "high road," in the
sense of reflecting few political compromises with the goals of
fundamental tax reform, the road of the President's proposals
and H.R. 3838 was decidedly downhill. Section V describes how
the relatively pure system proposed in Treasury I was dismembered and distorted as it moved through the political process.
Section VI identifies the components of Treasury I that make it
truly fundamental tax reform. The bottom line is that while H.R.
3838 may be an improvement over current law, it is certainly not
fundamental tax reform.
II.

IDEALS OF TAx REFORM

Three primary objectives are commonly attributed to tax reform: fairness or equity, economic neutrality and simplification.
Some treat encouragement of economic growth as an additional
objective. However, others believe that economic growth will be
adequate, and perhaps faster, if only tax policy did not distort
economic decision-making and therefore the allocation of economic resources. Similarly, various observers place different importance on "international competitiveness" as a goal of tax
policy. Finally, tax policy can contribute to macro-economic stability by assuring that the difference between government spending and tax revenues falls within acceptable bounds.
This section has two objectives. First, it describes three idealized bases for taxation: annual income, annual consumption
and lifetime income. Then it notes that annual income, the tax
base underlying Treasury I and the proposals and legislation de-
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rived from it, is inherently inferior to lifetime income as a basis
for taxation. Whether it is also inferior to a tax based on annual
consumption depends on one's view of the importance of basing
taxation on income, rather than consumption.
A.

Goals of Tax Reform

Virtually everyone agrees-at least in principle-that taxation should be fair, economically neutral, and simple. Therefore,
the principal task of tax reform is to design a tax system that
meets these various objectives. Of course, where these objectives
conflict, disagreements may exist as to the relative importance of
the various objectives. Additionally, many will suggest that economic growth or international competitiveness should also be
listed as explicit goals of tax policy.
An important criterion of fairness is that of horizontal equity,
the notion that taxpayers in similar circumstances should pay similar amounts of tax. In other words, if income (consumption) is
chosen as the proper measure of tax-paying ability, those with
equal incomes (amounts of consumption) should pay taxes that
are quite similar, if not exactly equal. By virtually any standard,
the current United States income tax does not score well on the
standard of horizontal equity. Those who receive income from
particular sources or in particular forms pay little or not tax on
the income. 7 By comparison, when received as dividends, income
resulting from equity investment in corporations is taxed twice.
Inflation results in effective tax rates that are higher than statutory rates for many investments and allows overstatement of interest deductions. In addition, certain uses of income are
subsidized by the tax system. 8 These subsidies act to lower the
tax liability of those who are able to take advantage of them.
The extent of horizontal inequity resulting from the use of
tax shelters is indicated by the following two sets of calculations.
First, about 11 % of returns with total positive income ("TPI" or
income before subtraction of various items of negative income
that reduce taxable income) in excess of $250,000-or even $1
million-paid less than 5% of TPI in taxes. By comparison,
nearly half (47%) of those with incomes in excess of $250,000
7. For example, income from interest on state and local securities, most
employee fringe benefits, and income in kind from owner-occupied housing are
not taxed, and for the most part little tax is paid on income from oil and gas.
8. For example, homeowners benefit from the mortgage interest deduction,
whereas those who rent do not have any similar deduction.
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owed at least 20% of TPI in tax, and even middle-income returns
with TPI of between $30,000 and $75,000 paid an average of
about 13% of TPI in taxes. 9
Second, the proposals of Treasury I, by eliminating most opportunities to shelter income, would have resulted in increases in
tax liabilities in excess of 2% of economic income for more than
15% of families with incomes in excess of $100,000, even though
more than 27% (for incomes of $100,000 to $200,000) and 49%
(for those with incomes in excess of $200,000) of families in those
income classes would have experienced tax decreases in excess of
2% of income. 10
Vertical equity-the relationship between tax liabilities at
various points in the scale measuring ability to pay (e.g., income
or consumption)-is a matter of social conscience and therefore
somewhat more elusive. In the formulation of Treasury I an attempt was made to sidestep this politically sensitive issue by proposing tax reforms that were (by at least one standard)
distributionally neutral."I This same basic approach was followed
in the formulation of the President's proposals and H.R. 3838.12
This issue is further addressed in Part D of Section III.
A tax is economically neutral if it does not affect economic
decisions (except by reducing real income or wealth). l3 The
9. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Taxes Paid by High-Income Taxpayers and the
Growth of Partnerships, 28 TAX NOTES 717, 718 (1985). For further documentation of the ability of high-income individual taxpayers to pay little or not tax, see
id. at 717-21.
10. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 1, at 54. These figures also indicate
clearly that horizontal inequities are substantially greater for upper-income
groups (those with economic income in excess of $100,000 per year) than for
those with lower incomes, reflecting the fact that both incentives and opportunities for tax sheltering are greater at high income levels. Id.
11. Treasury I would have reduced tax liabilities in economic income classes
as follows: over $200,000 by 8%; $100,000-200,000 by 6.4%; $50,000-100,000
by 7.4%; $30,000-50,000 by 9.3% and all income classes by an average of 8.5%.
See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 1, at 47.
12. The President's Proposals did, however, reduce taxes paid by those
with incomes in excess of $200,000 by 10.7%, compared to a reduction of 7.0%
for all households and barely 4% for those with incomes of $50,000-200,000.
See The President's Tax Proposals to the Congressfor Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity
(May 1985) [hereinafter cited as Presidents Proposals]. The greater cuts at the top
of the income scale are the inevitable consequence of the decisions to maintain
many tax preferences of special benefit to high-income taxpayers and limit the
top marginal rate to 35%.
13. Economists will recognize that the parenthetical qualification in the text
is intended to indicate that neutrality involves only substitution effects, that is,
effects on the allocation of resources induced by changes in relative prices;
changes in resource allocation that result from changes in real income or wealth
are not considered in appraising the neutrality of taxation. A tax system that is
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types of decisions that can be-and are-distorted by taxation are
legion. They include the decision whether to save or consume;14
whether to work; the choices of types of investments; decisions on
risk taking, invention and innovation; decisions on business form
(i.e., whether to use the corporate or non-corporate form of business organization); decisions on means of business finance (especially debt versus equity finance and dividend payout ratios);
decisions on the composition of employee compensation (e.g.,
taxable wages versus tax-exempt fringe benefits) and consumption choices (among various differentially taxed goods and services). Taxation will be economically neutral only if two or more
alternatives facing a given decision maker are subject to the same
effective marginal tax rate.
Underlying the attempt to make the tax system more neutral
is President Reagan's view that, generally, the tax system should
not be employed to implement social or economic policies. 1 5 In
this sense Treasury I was a free-market manifesto. Of course, that
view, especially in recent years, runs directly counter to the historical development of the United States tax system.
Complexity takes at least two distinct forms. The first, and
perhaps more important, is the difficulty and burden experienced
neutral is not necessarily optimal, since it may not minimize loss of welfare resulting from taxation. Moreover, a neutral tax system would not steer economic
decision makers away from pollution and other socially harmful activities. For a
technical explanation of the theory of optimal taxation, see A. ATKINSON & J.
STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS (1980).

14. Strictly speaking, it is the choice between present and future consumption that is distorted by taxation. This choice can be distorted even if there is no
tax-induced change in the allocation of funds between saving and current consumption. For elaboration of this point, see Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of Capital
Income Taxation, 86J. POL EcON. S29-S51 (April 1978) or, for a more elementary
exposition, McLure, Taxes, Savings, and Welfare: Theory and Evidence, 33 NAT'L TAX
J. 311-20 (1980). Despite the technical inaccuracy of such a reference, this article shall refer to tax-induced distortions of the saving-consumption choice.
15. In speaking to a joint Session of Congress on the Program for Economic Recovery, February 18, 1981, President Ronald Reagan gave the following assessment of the proper role of taxation:
"The taxing power of
government must be used to provide revenues for legitimate government purposes. It must not be used to regulate the economy or bring about social
change." Address before a Joint Session of the Congress, 17 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 130, 137 (Feb. 18, 1981). Such exceptions to strict neutrality as deductions for charitable contributions, and expensing and credits for research
and experimentation can be justified on the basis of external social benefits.
Turnier, Personal Deductions and Tax Reform: The High Road and the Low Road, 32
VILL. L. REV. 1701, 1726-27 (1986). Others, such as the home mortgage deduction and the exclusion of interest on state and local taxes, have little economic
justification; they were kept almost entirely for political reasons. Brannon, Tax
Loopholes as OriginalSin: Lessons from Tax History, 32 VILL. L. REv. 1763, 1767-69,
1774-75 (1986).
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in reading and understanding instructions, keeping records, and
completing tax returns. This is the form of complexity that is
probably most familiar to taxpayers.
The second, which may be of equal importance, is the complication of economic life that results from non-neutral taxation.
Under a truly neutral tax system, taxpayers can simply respond to
economic incentives, without the necessity of considering the tax
consequences of their decisions. Thus, production managers can
worry about production, dentists can concentrate on dentistry
and investors can consider the economic advantages of alternative investments without being concerned about the tax consequences of their decisions or about how to minimize taxes. By
comparison, if the tax system is not neutral, economic decisionmakers are faced with the additional complication of considering
tax consequences as well as economic results in making their decisions. For many businessmen and investors, this second form of
complexity may be every bit as important as the first. It might be
noted that many view simplification and tax reform as one and the
same thing. They see others benefit from provisions of the tax
code that they do not use and wish that the tax code could be
"simplified" to eliminate these provisions. Thus, they desire simplification (reform) for others, as well as for themselves.
As noted earlier, some observers believe that tax policy
should be employed to stimulate economic growth or the international competitiveness of the United States economy. The Treasury I view denies that the tax system needs to be used for either of
these purposes. It agrees that taxation should not unduly hinder
either economic growth or international competitiveness, but believes that both growth and competitiveness would be adequate if
only the tax system were more neutral and did not impede growth
or our ability to compete internationally.
B.

Income and Consumption Taxes

Income has traditionally been accepted as the proper measure of taxpaying ability.1 6 However, this view has not been universally accepted, and in recent years, leading tax authorities have
expressed an especially strong interest in consumption-based
16. For a review of arguments for and against income and consumption as

measures of tax-paying ability, see, for example, Goode,
TAX

THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME
WHAT

(1976); id. (1980); Bradford, The Casefor a Personal Consumption Tax, in

SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE?

75-113 (J. Pechman, ed. 1980).

For additional arguments in favor of the personal expenditure or consumed income tax, see infra references in note 17.
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personal taxation.' 7 However, many who understand and appreciate the manifest advantages of a personal tax on consumption,
which would be measured by cash flow, are concerned by the distributional implications of switching from income to consumption
as the measure of taxpaying ability.' 8 A third alternative, based
on taxation of lifetime income rather than annual income, has recently been put forward as a means of realizing the primary advantages of both income and consumption taxes. 19 However, its
feasibility depends on the politically vulnerable proposal to include gifts and bequests in the tax base of donors and decedents.
Despite the substantial advantages of a system of taxation
based on cash flow, be it of the consumption or lifetime income
variety, Treasury I (like the President's proposals and H.R. 3838)
follows the more traditional approach of an annual income tax.
This section describes briefly the major difficulties of an annual
income tax, the economic and administrative advantages of the
systems based on cash flow, and some of the reasons for rejecting
the latter in favor of the traditional annual income tax approach.
1. The Tax on Annual Income
For reasons to be indicated below, Treasury I adopted annual
income as its tax base, rather than either consumption or lifetime
income. In order to meet the basic objectives of horizontal equity, economic neutrality and simplicity, it adopted as its proximate objective the uniform and consistent taxation of all real
economic income, regardless of the source or use of income.2 0 In
many respects, the base broadening required to implement a
comprehensive tax on annual income is no different from that required under a comprehensive tax on consumed income or life17. For discussions in favor of a consumption based tax, see W. Andrews, A
Consumption-type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974);
D. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX
REFORM 11 (2d ed. rev. 1984) [hereinafter cited as D. BRADFORD]; LODIN, PROGRESSIVE EXPENDITURE TAX-AN ALTERNATIVE? (1978); MEADE COMMITTEE, THE
STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION (Allen & Unwin eds. 1978);
Mieszkowski, The Advisability and Feasibility of an Expenditure Tax System, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 179 (H. Aaron & M. Boskin eds. 1980).
18. A tax based on consumption is, under certain conditions, equivalent to
either a zero tax on capital income or a tax on labor earnings. Thus, substituting
it for the income tax would shift the tax burden to consumers or wage earners
and away from wealthy taxpayers. See D. BRADFORD, supra note 17, at 122-23.
19. See H. AARON & H. GALPER, ASSESSING TAX REFORM 66 (1985).
20. For an attempt to implement a definition of real economic income in
assessing the distributional implications of tax reform, see TREASURY I, supra
note 2, vol. 1, at 57-59.
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time income. These issues are not discussed at this point.
Rather, the remainder of this subsection is devoted to a brief discussion of inflation and the time value of money, two problems of
income measurement that are inherent in the tax on annual income, as well as the double taxation of corporate income, a problem that can be handled more easily under a cash-flow tax than
under a tax on annual income. 2 1 Significantly, H.R. 3838 takes
virtually no steps to deal with two of these problems. The distortion of the saving-consumption choice inherent in an annual tax
on income is discussed in subsection 2 below.
a.

Inflation Adjustment

Perhaps the most fundamental proposal contained in Treasury
I was that which called for inflation adjustment-of depreciation
allowances, cost of goods sold from inventory, capital gains and
interest income and expense. 22 Unless inflation has been abolished, in the absence of an inflation adjustment in the calculation
of income from business and investment, it is meaningless to
speak of uniform and consistent taxation of all income. Income
from wages and salaries that is paid currently is measured accurately (if it is included in the tax base), regardless of the rate of
inflation. However, in an inflationary period, nominal capital
gains exceed real economic gains, real interest income and expense are both overstated, costs of goods sold calculated using
first-in, first-out (FIFO) inventory accounting are understated,
and depreciation allowances are understated, unless they are deliberately accelerated (relative to economic depreciation) as an ad
hoc adjustment for inflation. While ad hoc measures such as the
exclusion of part of long term capital gains, the acceleration of
depreciation allowances, and the use of last-in, first-out (LIFO)
inventory accounting can compensate for inflation, they do so
inadequately, because the accuracy of the particular adjustment
depends on the actual rate of inflation experienced.2 3 Mis21. Distortions caused by inflation would disappear under a consumption
tax based on cash flow because all outlays for savings or investments would be
fully deductible when made. See H. AARON & H. GALPER, supra note 19, at 87. A
consumption-based tax would eliminate the need to consider the time value of
money because only cash flow would be considered in determining tax liability.
Id. The cash flow tax on corporations would be fully integrated with individual
taxes. Id. For a further discussion of the problems of inflation and the time
value of money under a tax on annual income, see H. AARON & H. GALPER, supra
note 19, at 55-63.
22. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 98-116; id., vol. 2, at 152-200.
23. Many would argue that LIFO produces a more accurate measure of in-
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measurement of income results from the failure to accurately adjust for inflation in the measurement of business and investment
income. This, in turn, creates horizontal inequities, economic
distortions and complexities. Moreover, it can hinder capital formation, growth and international competitiveness.
The only way to avoid these problems in the context of an
annual income tax is to allow for inflation in the measurement of
income from business and investment. Treasury I contained a farreaching, if imperfect, attempt at inflation adjustment. The proposals for inflation adjustment for depreciation allowances, inventories and capital gains were generally satisfactory and require
little comment. 2 4 On the other hand, though better than current
law, the inflation adjustment for interest income and expense
were known to be imperfect and would create at least two techni25
cal problems if enacted.
Conceptually, the correct way to allow for inflation in the
case of debt instruments is either to reduce both reported interest
income and deductible interest expense by the product of the inflation rate and the amount of outstanding debt or to adjust the
basis of the debt by that amount. 26 Because this pure approach
was thought to be administratively infeasible, Treasury I followed
come than FIFO and not that it is an ad hoc offset to inflation. Others would
counter that LIFO improperly takes account of shifts in relative prices, as well as
changes in price levels.
24. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 151-92. The proposal for indexed depreciation allowances, which were based on the inflation adjustment of
the best available estimates of economic depreciation, were generally subject to
attack on two technical grounds. The first argument, that economic depreciation cannot be measured accurately, has nothing to do with the accuracy of the
inflation adjustment per se. However, it may raise doubts about the wisdom of
relying entirely on inflation adjustment to compensate for the effects of inflation. The second objection, that replacement costs in some industries do not
closely track changes in the consumer price index (the index proposed by the
Treasury Department for use in inflation adjustment) reflects a misunderstanding of the purpose of inflation adjustment. The objective is to measure real
income accurately, not to assure that capital can be replaced tax free, without
regard to movements in relative prices. For this purpose, use of a general price
index is appropriate.
25. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 197-200. In addition to the two
technical defects described below, there was the basic defect that interest indexing would not apply to mortgage interest on the principal residence of the taxpayer. Indeed, Treasury I would not have even required that mortgage income
be offset against mortgage interest expense, with only net interest income being
indexed. C. McLure, The Tax Treatment of Owner-OccupiedHousing: The Achilles Heel
of Tax Reform? in TAX REFORM AND REAL ESTATE 219-32

(J.

Follain ed. 1986).

26. These two approaches involve an important issue of timing. Adjusting
current interest income and expense to allow for inflation involves current recognition of changes in the purchasing power of outstanding debt, whereas adjustment of basis postpones recognition until debt is repaid.
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an alternative ad hoc approach. A percentage of interest income
and expense would be disregarded depending on the rate of infla27
tion experienced during the year.
Though superior to the implicit assumption in current law
that inflation does not exist, the Treasury I approach to interest
indexing suffers from two obvious flaws. First, it clearly produces
the wrong results in virtually all cases. Second, it results in partial
28
exclusion of the "spread" of financial institutions.
b.

Time-Value Of Money

In order to be totally fair and neutral, taxation must apply as
income accrues, rather than merely as it is realized. However, the
United States tax system has historically been based almost entirely on realization; the use of depreciation allowances is a longstanding notable exception. A tax based solely on realization accords preferential treatment to industries in which recognition of
expenses normally precedes recognition of the income they create. Such "natural deferral industries" include oil and gas, mining, timber, and orchards and vineyards. Analogous problems
can occur in the case of multi-year construction of assets if income is recognized under the completed contract method of accounting. Related problems occur in the case of bonds purchased
at a discount and the expense of decommissioning nuclear power
plants and reclaiming strip mines. In all of these areas, and
27. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 194-200. The exclusion rate was
to be calculated by dividing the rate of inflation by the sum of that rate plus 6%.
Implicit in this procedure is an assumption that the real rate of interest is 6%.
See H. AARON & H. GALPER, supra note 19, at 62. This overly high estimate of'the
real rate of interest was chosen deliberately in order to avoid overstating the
inflation adjustment.
28. Suppose, for example, that a bank borrows at 8% and lends at 10% at a
time when the inflation rate is 4%. Under an ideal system of indexing, taxable
interest income and allowable interest deduction would, in effect, both be reduced by four percentage points, leaving unchanged the two percentage points
spread between borrowing and lending rates. The Treasury I proposal, however,
in effect applied a fractional exclusion to net interest income or expenses. Thus,
it would reduce the spread representing the taxable interest income of the bank
by 40%. This illustration also shows that the proposed technique of interest
indexing would be defective for most net borrowers or lenders who are active as
both creditors and debtors. By coincidence, the 40% exclusion rate in the example is exactly correct for the debtor paying an interest rate of 10% to the
bank. Under the Treasury I proposal, if the inflation rates were 4%, the 40%
exclusion rate would apply to all borrowers and lenders, including those that
had entered into contracts for interest rates well above or below 10%. For example, the recipient of interest income at a rate of 8% from the bank would
exclude only 40% of net interest, even though inflation would, by assumption,
offset 50% of nominal interest income.
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others, important issues of the "time value of money" arise because the timing of accrual of income and expense differs from
that of cash flow.
Treasury I contains an astonishing array of complicated provisions intended to deal with issues resulting from the unwillingness to adopt either a strict cash flow or a pure accrual approach
to taxation. 29 Among these are requirements for capitalizati6n of
expenses in the case of multi-period production, recognition of
income in the event of the pledge of installment obligations, restrictions on eligibility for the use of the cash method of accounting, elimination of deductions for reserves for bad debts and
elimination of ensuing intangible drilling costs in the oil and gas
industry.
c. Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes
The United States is almost alone among major developed
countries in not allowing meaningful relief from double taxation
of dividends. The existence of a separate unintegrated tax on
corporate income results in double taxation of corporate equity
income distributed as dividends. This produces horizontal inequities, encourages undue reliance on debt finance, discourages
payment of dividends and discriminates against investment in the
corporate sector.3 0 This problem cannot be solved in the context
of an annual income tax by simply eliminating the corporate income tax, without freeing all retained earnings of corporations
from tax. However, relief can be provided for double taxation of
dividends by such techniques as shareholder credits for corporate
taxes, corporate deductions for dividends paid and application of
split-rate systems to amounts that are distributed and retained.
But complete integration, for retained earnings as well as dividends, is generally deemed to be infeasible for administrative
3
reasons. '
2.

The Tax On Consumed Income

Recent years have seen substantial academic interest in a personal tax on expenditures or consumed income. In common par29. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 1, ch. 7; id. vol. 2, ch. 10. Provisions
dealing with the time value of money are also found in the discussions of the
taxation of energy and natural resources and the taxation of financial institutions. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 2, ch. 11, 12.
30. See id. at 134-35.

31. See C.

McLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TwICE?

146-84

(1979).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 6 [1986], Art. 2

1632

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3 1: p. 1619

lance this may be expressed as a preference for basing taxes on
consumption, rather than on income. Unlike indirect taxes on
consumption, such as retail sales taxes and value-added taxes
which are levied on transactions and do not allow for the personal
circumstances of the taxpayer, the tax on consumed income is implemented through tax returns that closely resemble income tax
returns. Therefore, a tax on consumed income can be personalized to take account of various taxpayer's circumstances. Under
one proposal the taxpayer receives a deduction for amounts deposited in "qualified accounts" and is taxed on amounts withdrawn from such accounts.3 2 Investments in capital goods are
expensed, but the proceeds of borrowing are included in taxable
income. As a result, only income that is consumed is subject to
'33
this tax on cash flow, hence the name "consumed income tax."
Economists tend to stress the inter-temporal neutrality and
fairness of the consumed income tax compared to the conventional annual income tax. 3 4 Whereas the annual income tax discriminates against saving for future consumption, the consumed
income tax is neutral with respect to the saving-consumption
choice.3 5 Moreover, the present value of a proportionate tax on
32. Under this type of a consumed income tax, almost all financial transactions would be conducted through IRA-type qualified accounts held at banks or
other financial institutions. See TREASURY I,supra note 2,at 194. Any amounts
put into a qualified account would be deductible. Id. Income earned on the
account would not be taxed until withdrawn. Id. For further exposition of the
mechanics of the use of qualified accounts to implement a tax on consumed income, see D. BRADFORD, supra note 17, at 110-14; Mieszkowski, supra note 17, at
193.
33. A form of consumption tax that resembles a peculiar form of a valueadded tax but is implemented in a way that resembles the income tax has been
proposed. See R. HALL & A. RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (1985); R. HALL & A.
RABUSHKA, Low TAX, SIMPLE TAX, FLAT TAX (1983). Because the Hall-Rabushka
Tax can provide personal exemptions, Treasury I describes it as a personal exemption value-added tax. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 3, at 44, 103. For a
further discussion of the Hall-Rabushka approach in the context of value-added
taxes, see generally Carlson & McLure, Pros and Cons of Alternative Approaches to the
Taxation of Consumption, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 77TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION OF THE NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION (1984).
34. See A. ATKINSON &J. STIGLITZ, supra note 13, at 62-63, 95, 563-66; D.
BRADFORD, supra note 17, at 102-09.
35. Suppose that the interest rate is 10%; this implies that in the absence of
taxation, 100 units of consumption today can be exchanged for 110 units of
consumption tomorrow. A consumption tax that applies equally to consumption
in both periods will not affect this rate of trade-off between present and future
consumption. By comparison, an income tax that applies to interest income will
modify the rate at which present consumption can be exchanged for future consumption. For example, if the income tax rate is 50%, a taxpayer who forgoes
consumption of 100 units today will be able to consume only 105 units tomorrow. Thus, the income tax distorts preferences in favor of present consump-
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consumed income is independent of the point in time in a person's life when income is earned and when it is consumed. The
conventional income tax, by comparison, is more generous towards early consumption and late receipt of income.
These economic benefits are not the most important reasons
for adopting a tax based on cash flow. Probably more important
is avoiding the administrative difficulties of implementing a tax on
annual income. 36 Under a cash flow tax, the two types of inherent
difficulties with the annual income tax, previously identified, simply vanish. In a cash flow tax system, there is no need for an inflation adjustment because all income flows automatically occur in
current dollars. In addition, there are no issues as to the time
value of money because recognition of taxable consumption is determined simply by current cash flow. Finally, integrating personal and corporate taxes based on cash flow is a relatively simple
matter.
3.

Tax On Lifetime Income

Many who recognize the economic and administrative benefits of cash flow taxation are concerned about the failure of the
consumed income tax to apply to income devoted to gifts and bequests.3 7 Failure to tax gifts and bequests would produce substantial disparities in the amount of taxes paid by taxpayers with
equal lifetime resources who make different bequests. Moreover,
total exclusion of gifts and bequests would facilitate growth in
large family fortunes and accentuate inequality in the distribution
of income.
Henry Aaron and Harvey Galper have proposed dealing with
this problem in the context of a tax based on cash flow by includ38
ing gifts and bequests in the tax base of the donor or decedent.
The taxpayer's total lifetime tax base would thus equal consumption plus gifts and bequests, or the total amount of resources
available for consumption during the lifetime. For this reason
tion. For more technical explanations and qualifications of this argument, see A.
ATKINSON &J. STIGLITZ, supra note 13, at72; Feldstein, supra note 14, at 529;

King, Savings and Taxation, in PUBLIC

POLICY AND THE TAX SYSTEM

(G. Hughes &

G. Heal eds. 1980).
36. For a strong statement in support of this view, see King, supra note 35,
at 32.
37. For a discussion of this concern, see H. AARON & H. GALPER, supra note
19, at 77, 94-97.
38. See id. at 94-97. Under both the consumed income tax and the lifetime
income tax, gifts and bequests would be included in the potentially taxable income of the recipient.
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Aaron and Galper refer to this tax as a tax on lifetime income.3 9
Like the tax on consumed income, the lifetime income tax is
based on cash flow and avoids the aforementioned problems of
inflation adjustment and the time value of money. Similarly, integration of the personal and corporation income taxes is straightforward under this approach.
4.

Choosing The Annual Income Tax

Despite the manifest advantages of taxation based on cash
flow, Treasury I chose annual income as the basis of taxation. A
number of factors lie behind this choice. First, there was serious
concern about whether certain fundamental problems could be
handled satisfactorily under the timetable set for the preparation
of Treasury 1.40 If a tax based on cash flow was proposed, it was
feared that insuperable problems might be encountered in the
following areas: transition, prevention of evasion and taxation of
international investment and income flows, including the need to
renegotiate all double taxation agreements with foreign governments. 4 ' Concern that "show-stoppers" might be found in one
or more of these areas (or others) precluded devoting all resources to development of a tax based on cash flow to the exclusion of work on the annual income tax. Moreover, the very
novelty of the tax on consumed income also militated against its
proposal.
A further reason for choosing the tax on annual income was
purely political. The distributional implications of the two variants of a cash flow tax previously described above are quite different, for a given pattern of rates, depending on how gifts and
bequests are treated. Advocates of a cash flow tax that included
gifts and bequests in the base of the donor or decedent might be
quite unwilling to support a similar tax that excluded such transfers. Similarly, advocates of a pure tax on consumed income
might have little interest in a cash flow tax that included gifts and
39. Id. at 66.
40. Work on Treasury I began in February, 1984. The deadline for submission of fundamental tax reform to the President was December, 1984. It should
be noted that this discussion of why Treasury I chose annual income as the tax
basis is not intended to be exhaustive. For a discussion of reasons for not proposing a tax based on cash flow, see TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 1, at 200-12.
For more on the practical problems of deciding whether a consumption-based
tax is feasible, see C. McLure, Reflections on Recent Proposals to Rationalize the United
States Income Tax (forthcoming in the Proceedings of the Annual Congress of the
International Institute of Public Finance (Madrid, August 26, 1985)).
41. Id.
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bequests in its base. If a cash flow tax had been proposed, the
likely political outcome might have been either a legislative impasse resulting from inability to agree on the tax treatment of
transfers or an unacceptable resolution of that issue. Given this
prospect, a proposal for a tax on annual income, with all its defects, appeared preferable to a proposal for a conceptually superior tax based on cash flow.
III.

STRATEGY OF TAx REFORM

History shows clearly that the achievement of fundamental
tax reform is no simple task. Even under ideal circumstances it is
difficult for the general interest-represented by a tax system that
is more equitable, less distortionary, and simpler-to triumph
over the special interests who defend the multitude of particular
provisions of the tax code that undermine fairness, neutrality and
simplicity. 4 2 This section discusses briefly several aspects of the
politics and strategy of tax reform: the choice between "incrementalism" and the "up or down" approach of Treasury I, the advantages and difficulties created by the unusual way in which
Treasury I was formulated, the political and economic importance
of rules for fair and orderly transition to a reformed system, the
role of distributional neutrality in the debate on tax reform, President Reagan's determination that tax reform must occur in a revenue neutral context and the importance of the starting point for
tax reform.
A.

Incrementalism or Up and Down?

In commenting on President Reagan's call for a plan for fundamental tax reform, many seasoned observers of the Washington scene have suggested that producing and proposing such a
plan would be an exercise in futility. 43 According to this way of
thinking, the American political process simply could not absorb
far-reaching and fundamental tax reform. If the tax system were
42. In his letter submitting Treasury I to President Reagan, Treasury Secretary Regan wrote the following,
Those who benefit from the current tax preferences that distort the use
of our nation's resources, that complicate paying taxes for all of us, and
that create inequities and undermine taxpayer morale will complain
loudly and seek support from every quarter. But a far greater number
of Americans will benefit from the suggested rate reduction and
simplification.
TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 1, at iv-v.
43. This is the assessment of Barber Conable, a former member of the
House Ways and Means Committee, who calls himself a "raging incrementalist."
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to be reformed, observers said, it must be through incremental
changes over time, provision by provision.
Treasury I did not adopt this pessimistic viewpoint. First,
under an incremental approach, it was thought to be impossible
to rally popular support for elimination of any but the most egregiously offensive provisions. Granted, reform of individual provisions might add to the fairness of the tax system, and perhaps
even increase its neutrality and reduce its complexity, but the visible gains from reform of any one provision would probably be so
small that popular support would be virtually nonexistent. The
experience of history suggests that most of those interested in
preserving particular provisions would have no difficulty in continuing to prevail over the general interest in such a case.
Second, it would be virtually impossible under the incrementalist approach to achieve a tax system that had internal consistency and logic. (Could we be sure, for example, that the
provisions for dealing with inflation in the calculation of depreciation allowances, capital gains and interest income and expense
were mutually consistent and consistent with other provisions?)
More important, even if such a system might ultimately be
achieved under the incrementalist approach, years would probably pass before the system achieved consistency and made sense.
During that time taxes would continue to be unfair and distortionary. Moreover, even if the incremental approach to fundamental
tax reform were successful, it would leave in its wake an absolute
swamp of transition rules that would greatly complicate administration and compliance for years to come. Eventually, the repeated cries of taxpayers to "quit changing the system" are likely
to be heeded. 44 This would prevent fundamental tax reform from
being fully achieved, and there is no reason to believe that a partially reformed system in place at such a time would be markedly
better than the current one. Certainly, it would be inferior to the
product of fundamental reform.
Treasury I was based on the proposition that fundamental tax
reform was most likely to occur if enacted in one comprehensive
act. Fundamental reform would make possible substantial reductions in horizontal inequities and distortions of resource allocation. If carefully explained, these advantages of reform might
44. This theme, leaving the tax system unchanged for a while, was among
the most commonly heard during the series of eight hearings held throughout
the country by the Treasury Department during the spring and summer of 1985
to elicit public views on the need and desirable contours of tax reform.
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appeal to the general public. Elimination of all preferential treatment would create important reductions in marginal tax rates, a
benefit that is far more understandable to the public than economists' esoteric arguments about reduced distortions and horizontal inequities. Moreover, fundamental reform could simplify
economic decision-making, as well as administration and compliance, producing benefits which the public could readily appreciate. In short, it might be possible to rally the public behind
fundamental tax reform in a way that would be impossible if tax
reform were to take an incremental approach.
To be politically viable, the "all-or-nothing" approach would
need to be just that: it would be necessary to propose the repeal
of virtually all important and highly visible tax preferences. This
would seem to be required by politics as well as economic integrity. As long as no important interest had been allowed to escape
tax reform, it would be relatively easy for members of Congress
to resist special pleading on behalf of any one industry or taxpayer group. But once Congress begins to make important concessions, tax reform would unravel politically, as well as
economically. Even those who would be willing to give up their
own pet provisions in the context of a fundamental reform that
eliminated all preferences, would be unwilling to do so if others
'45
were let "off the hook."
An important difficulty with the all-or-nothing approach is
that many provisions for preferential treatment that economists
decry are quite popular with the public. Notable examples include the itemized deductions for home mortgage interest, state
and local taxes, and charitable contributions. 4 6 Even many of
those who would benefit from a combination of rate reductions
and curtailment of such preferences fail to support such a policy,
presumably because they fail to understand fully the opportunity
costs (in terms of rate reduction) of the provisions. If enough of
these important provisions were to survive tax reform, substantial
rate reduction would be impossible in the context of revenue
neutrality.
A further political difficulty of tax reform results from the
existence of a multitude of less important provisions that make no
45. Throughout this paper, the term "tax preference" is used in the generic
sense to describe deviations from uniform and consistent taxation of real economic income, rather than as the term of art employed, for example, in provisions dealing with the minimum tax.
46. See generally Brannon, supra note 15; Turnier, supra note 15.
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sense and yet carry significant emotional appeal. These include
the special exemptions for the aged and the blind, the exclusion
of unemployment insurance and worker's compensation and the
tax-free status of all veterans benefits. 4 7 Proposals to curtail such
provisions produce storms of righteous indignation that jeopardize the cause of tax reform, despite the reality that the truly needy
would be protected from reductions in benefits. Any attempt to
replace these provisions with explicit but less generous spending
programs or with more properly structured (and hence less generous) provisions for preferential tax treatment generates opposition that would undermine the political feasibility of tax reform.
B.

The Formulation of Treasury I

Treasury I was produced under conditions that were, for a variety of different reasons, difficult. 48 First, the time frame of only
ten months from announcement to due date meant that there was
relatively little time for original thinking or innovative proposals.
Instead, the distillation of the conventional wisdom among tax experts was the order of the day. Moreover, given this timetable
and the need for confidentiality, it was difficult to employ outside
experts as consultants. This reduced the likelihood of novel proposals such as a tax based on cash flow. It also meant including
some proposals that could not be fully developed in the allotted
time period, and resulted in a few technical errors. Finally it
meant that adequate staff time was not available for full development of the economic analysis necessary to sell the tax reform
proposals-or even to defend them effectively against their
critics.
Second, Treasury I was produced during an election year.
Rather than surviving intact as a proposal for fundamental tax reform, it could easily have been nibbled away as the Reagan Administration promised to preserve particular provisions in order
to gain the support of various special interest groups. As it
turned out, the home mortgage deduction was the only provision
removed from the table of tax reform in this way. 49
47. For the text of the exemptions for the aged and blind, see I.R.C.
§§ 104-105 (West Supp. 1986). For the text of the exclusion of veterans benefits, see 38 U.S.C. § 7 7 0(g) (West Supp. 1986).
48. For further discussion of the difficulties of formulating proposals for
fundamental tax reform, see McLure, supra note 40 (forthcoming).
49. President Reagan also indicated publicly that fairness toward the American family would be an important objective of tax reform. The provisions in
Treasury I and the President's proposals to increase the personal exemption to
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The relationship between the Treasury Department and the
White House (and other agencies of the executive branch) during
the formulation of Treasury I deserves special attention. Secretary
of the Treasury Donald Regan was forced to walk a tightrope as,
for political reasons, it was convenient for President Reagan to be
able to say truthfully during the campaign that he did not know
what the Treasury Department would be recommending. Moreover, if the White House had been involved in the formulation of
Treasury I, leaks would almost certainly have occurred. Once provisions became public, political compromises would have been
made and fundamental tax reform would have been lost. Thus, as
the tax reform package was being developed, the White House
knew very little about the likely contents of Treasury I. On the
negative side, this meant that Treasury I could not realistically be
described as an Administration proposal. While tax reform proposals bearing the imprimatur of the Secretary of the Treasury
carry far more weight than proposals from other sources, without
a Presidential endorsement, such proposals would not immediately be of more than academic interest.
Since the White House had no prior knowledge of the contents of Treasury I, it is hardly surprising that President Reagan
did not immediately adopt the proposals in their entirety. But the
hands-off approach of the White House, perhaps expressed most
graphically in Secretary Regan's statement that the proposals
were written on a word processor, indicated clearly that changes
would be made and provided the signal for special interests to
come forward and make their cases. Of course, the prospect of
$2000 and eliminate the deduction for second earners have sometimes been interpreted as a response to conservative demands that tax reform favor the traditional family, in which both parents are present and only the father is employed
outside the home. Such is not the case. Conservatives were well aware of research by a member of the Treasury Department's Office of Tax Analysis documenting the deterioration of the real value of the tax threshold. Steuerle, The
Tax Treatment of Households of Different Size, in TAXING THE FAMILY 73 (R. Penner
ed. 1983). However, their insistence on an increase in the tax threshold was no
more than incidental in the formulation of the Treasury Department's proposal
to increase the personal exemption and zero bracket amount (ZBA) enough to
raise tax thresholds to the poverty level. It is also notable that the largest increase in the ZBA was for heads of households, hardly the typical traditional
family. Finally, concern for so-called traditional values played absolutely no part
in the decision to propose elimination of the deduction for second earners.
That decision was based on recognition that the deduction in current law is not
structured properly to achieve its intended effect and the belief that a provision
such as the second earner deduction would be substantially less essential with a
rate structure of the type being proposed in Treasury I. See TREASURY I, supra
note 2, vol. 2, at 13-14.
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eliminating important reform proposals from the package the
President would be submitting to the Congress, as well as being
undesirable in its own right, threatened the political viability of
fundamental tax reform. From the time Treasury I was unveiled,
the all or nothing approach was in jeopardy.
Treasury I seems to have caught many of those who would
have been most adversely affected by tax reform off-guard and
unprepared. Few seemed to have expected the Treasury Department to propose such far-reaching reforms. Had the White
House moved quickly to determine what modifications it wanted
to make in Treasury I and then submitted the revised package to
Congress, passage of a more comprehensive tax reform package
might have been possible. The unfortunate lapse of six months
between the release of Treasury I and submission of the President's proposals-explained, in part, by the Regan-Baker job
switch 5°-allowed special interests to regroup and gear up for
battle and thus undermined the cause of tax reform.
C.

Transition Provisions

The "all-or-nothing" approach to tax reform underlying
Treasury I does not imply that all reforms of current law should be
implemented immediately or simultaneously. As the discussion
of fair and orderly transition in Treasury I indicates, 5 1 it is neither
fair nor economically sensible to suddenly make drastic changes
in the fiscal landscape. The windfall gains and losses and the economic disruptions caused by sudden change are simply too great
to be tolerated.
Moreover, it may not be politically feasible to make sudden
changes. Certainly, it would be easier from a political point of
view to make changes that reach full effectiveness only over time
than to change the tax law immediately, without any provisions
for transition relief. Changes can be made gradually by using future effective dates, by phasing them in, or by grandfathering existing assets. If given a chance to adjust to the future tax law,
businesses and individuals are less likely to resist changes than if
faced with economic hardships caused by sudden changes in the
law. In other words, from a political point of view, as well as from
the viewpoint of economic good sense, there is much to be said
50. James Baker was sworn in as Secretary of the Treasury on February 3,
1985, succeeding Donald Regan, who resigned to become Chief of Staff at the
White House.
51. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 1, at 19-20 and 229-30.
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for gradually implementing fundamental tax reform. After all,
there is no compelling reason for quickly changing the fundamental structure of a tax system that has been in place for seventy
years. Moreover, the necessity of implementing reform gradually
need not be a deterrent to enacting fundamental tax reform.
Even though the President wants to be identified with fundamental reform, there is nothing preventing reform enacted during his
term of office from becoming effective at a later date.
Unfortunately, all political considerations do not fortuitously
point in this direction. Rather, politicians naturally want to take
credit immediately for provisions that, considered by themselves,
reduce revenues. Most notable among these are provisions that
increase personal exemptions and reduce rates. Moreover, there
may be concern that any provision for tax reduction that does not
become effective immediately might be repealed before its implementation in order to reduce the deficit or to change the distribution of tax burdens across income classes. 5 2 But if the benefits of
these revenue-losing provisions are to be granted immediately,
the requirement of revenue neutrality implies that the reforms
that raise revenue must also take effect on the same timetable.
The timetable for implementing the reforms proposed in
Treasury I was, unfortunately, dictated by such short-run political
considerations, rather than economic good sense. For example,
because of the desire to reduce individual income tax rates and to
raise personal exemptions quickly, the investment tax credit
would be eliminated on January 1, 1986, the deduction for state
and local taxes would be eliminated within two years, and beginning in 1988, interest indexing would apply to outstanding
debt. 5 3 It is hardly surprising that those who would be adversely
affected by these precipitous changes protested vigorously. One
can only speculate whether the prospects for fundamental tax reform would have been better or worse if more reasonable transition rules had been proposed in Treasury I.
52. At the time formulation of Treasury I was nearing completion, Democrats in the Congress were proposing that benefits from the third year of the
1981 rate reductions be capped, and therefore largely denied to upper income
individuals.
53. Effective January 1, 1986, personal exemptions would have been raised
to $2000. In order to meet the goal of revenue neutrality during the first year,
the reduction in tax rates for individuals was delayed until July 1, 1986. For a
full list of transition provisions in Treasury I, see TREASURY I supra note 2, vol. 1,
at 233-43.
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D. DistributionalNeutrality
Tax reform has historically been a liberal cause motivated by
the desire to increase the overall progressivity of the tax system
by reducing or eliminating provisions that are especially advantageous to upper-income individuals and corporations. 54 Treasury I
took a quite different approach. It concentrated on horizontal inequities, economic neutrality and simplification. It sidestepped
vertical equity by aiming for equal percentage reductions in tax
liabilities at all income levels except for the very bottom, where
percentage reductions would be much larger. The objective of
distributional neutrality, defined in this way, characterized the
55
1985 debate on tax reform.
Many observers presumed that revenue neutrality would be
applied separately to corporations and to individuals, rather than
being interpreted as simply requiring that the sum of individual
and corporate tax liabilities remains unchanged after tax reform.
Treasury I, however, contained a substantial increase in corporate
taxes and a corresponding reduction of individual taxes.5 6 Several factors explained this choice. First, the definition of taxable
income was determined on technical grounds. The objective was
to tax all real economic income uniformly and consistently. Thus,
the shift of tax liabilities should be attributed to the choice of tax
rates, not the definition of the base. Under Treasury I, it was
deemed undesirable to have a substantial difference between the
corporate rate and the top individual rate. 57 This was especially
true because taxable income would reflect economic income
much more closely than it does under current law. A 37% top
54. Fred Harris, a former member of the Senate Finance Committee, and
former Chairman of the Tax Action Campaign, has been quoted as saying that
every poll showed that people felt the rich and corporations didn't pay their fair
share. Pierson, Tax Reform in the 70's: Tilting at Windmills, Oil Rigs, and the Middle
Class, 28 TAx NOTES 1229, 1231 (1985). The targets of reform remained mostly
the rich and corporations. Id. at 1234.
55. This is, of course, only one of several ways (and not necessarily the best
one) in which distributional neutrality might be defined. An alternative would
have been to define distributional neutrality as an equal percentage increase in
after-tax incomes. This would have produced a substantially more progressive
pattern of post-reform average tax rates. See also Musgrave & Tun Thin, Income
Tax Progression, 56J. POL. EcoN. 498-514 (1948).
56. For the amount of the increase in corporate taxes and decrease in indi-

vidual taxes, see

TREASURY DEP'T REP.,

supra note 2, vol. 1, at 45.

57. If the corporate tax rate is significantly lower than the top rate for individuals, many high-income individuals could incorporate to avoid the higher individual rate. For a critical discussion of this objective, see Ballentine, Where Is
the Income Tax Rationalefor The Shift to Higher Corporate Taxes?, 30 TAx NOTES 443
(1986).
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marginal rate for individuals would have produced both revenue
neutrality and distributional neutrality for individual taxpayers.
However, the 37% rate was deemed to be too far above the 28%
corporate rate that would have produced revenue neutrality for

corporate taxpayers.
Second, the shift of liabilities from individuals to corporations was judged to be necessary for political reasons. That is, it
was deemed necessary to propose both a substantial reduction in
individual income tax liabilities (not just reductions in marginal
tax rates) as well as a more rational system that exhibited greater
equity, neutrality and simplicity. Without a shift of liabilities from
individuals to corporations, there would only be a slight increase
in the number of individuals who would experience tax cuts
rather than tax increases. (The fact that those with tax reductions
outnumbered those with tax increases indicates that the relatively
few who make the greatest use of tax preferences are taking advantage of the more numerous taxpayers who make less use of
preferences.)
Third, there was some concern that the reductions in corporate tax liabilities resulting from the 1981 tax act might have been
overly generous. 5 Finally, much of the increase in corporate liabilities would result from curtailment of provisions that, being of
particular benefit to specific industries, are particularly inappropriate, rather than a generalized increase in corporate taxes. 59
The acceptance of a shift of liabilities from individuals to corporations in Treasury I, which was included in the President's proposals at an attenuated level, conditioned the debate on tax
reform in the Congress. Having proposed such a shift, it would
be difficult for the administration to object to H.R. 3838, which
included a similar shift of liabilities. Of course, as in Treasury I,
much of the proposed increase in corporate taxes contained in
H.R. 3838 came from sectors that have historically used preferential provisions to pay little or no taxes.
E.

The Constraint of Revenue Neutrality

In response to prodding from Walter Mondale during the
presidential debates, President Reagan promised that he would
58. For the corporate tax liability reductions in the 1981 Act, see H.R. REP.
No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 231, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS

105.

59. For a discussion of the sources of increased corporate tax liabilities, see
supra note 5. See also TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 1, at 245-54.
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not tolerate a tax increase as part of fundamental tax reform.
Since this promise has frequently been reiterated by Regan and
other administration officials, revenue neutrality has been an essential element in Treasury I, the President's proposals, H.R. 3838
and the ensuing debate in the Senate.
The constraint of revenue neutrality has a potentially important positive effect on the tax reform debate. First, in the context
of truly fundamental tax reform, revenue neutrality helps assure
that advocates of special provisions recognize the opportunity
cost of such provisions; if a given preference is to be retained, it is
necessary to make up the revenue. Conversely, advocates of tax
reforms can be relatively confident that revenue raised through
base broadening will be reflected in rate reductions, rather than
finding its way into deficit reduction or increased spending. Of
course, once compromises are made to retain some preferences,
this line of reasoning loses much of its force.
The promise of revenue neutrality has had another fundamental effect. Treasury I devoted an entire volume to examination
60 It
of general sales taxation, including a value-added tax (VAT).
concluded, however, that it would be senseless to introduce a
VAT if revenues generated from it were only employed to offset
revenue reductions caused by lower-income tax rates. 6 ' In the
absence of the revenue neutrality constraint, a VAT or some other
form of general sales tax might have been chosen as a means of
both reducing the deficit and replacing part of the income tax.
Having the VAT revenues available for this purpose might
have both helped and hindered the tax reform process. Target
rate reductions and increases in personal exemptions could have
been reached more easily without taking such a hard line toward
base broadening. But if this approach is carried to the extreme,
the existing defective income tax might have been left in place,
with a VAT, lower rates and increased exemptions in the income
tax being the only lasting legacy. With VAT revenues available to
finance these two forms of reductions in individual taxes, the corporate-individual shift that has so incensed business groups and
many members of Congress would not have been necessary. Of
60. See generally TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 3.
61. Preliminary cost estimates by the IRS indicate that implementation of a
VAT would cost $700 million per year once the tax is fully implemented. See
TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 3, at 124, 128. In addition, enforcing the tax
system would require an additional 20,000 employees. See id., vol. 3, at 128.
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course, those who are concerned about the regressivity of a VAT
would have attempted to block such a development.
F.

The Tyranny of the StartingPoint

The process of legislating (or even proposing) tax reform exhibits considerable resistance to change. Those who benefit from
preferential treatment under current law fight hard to protect
their privileges by wrapping them with whatever arguments and
protective devices they can muster. Industries that would never
have come into existence in the absence of preferential tax treatment send lobbyists to plead their cases. Provisions that make
little sense, and which may not have even had strong advocates
before enactment, suddenly become sanctified and are protected
by the special interest groups they have spawned.
The tyranny of the starting point is worth particular notice in
two cases, that of the deduction for state and local taxes and the
investment incentives enacted as part of the Economic Recovery
62
Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA).
Suppose that someone were to propose a federal program to
subsidize the expenditures of state and local governments. One
might reasonably question why public expenditures should be
subsidized, relative to private expenditures, but that is only the
first problem. Suppose further that it was suggested that the subsidy rate should depend on the income level of individual taxpayers living in each state or local jurisdiction and that contrary to
expectations, the subsidy rate would rise with income, rather than
decline. Moreover, in the case ofjurisdictions with heavy concentrations of taxpayers who do not itemize deductions-generally
lower-income families-there would be little or no subsidy at all.
We might all agree that the characteristics of the subsidy scheme
just described do not constitute good public policy and would
63
presume that no such program would be enacted.
62. See H.R. REP. No. 201, supra note 58.
63. Aaron and Galper employ the same type of argument in demonstrating
the defects of the current tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. See H.
AARON & H. GALPER, supra note 19, at 17. Their description of this "home ownership assistance" program follows:
Most members of both houses of Congress today embraced a new
homeownership assistance program. Under this program homeowners
will be entitled to rebates based on the amount of their mortgages and
the interest rate on those mortgages.
Unlike many assistance programs, however, the amount of aid will
rise with income, and there will be no limit on the maximum payment.
Four-person families with incomes of less than $7,400 will be entirely
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Yet, those are precisely the characteristics of the deduction
for state and local taxes, one of the most staunchly defended of all
tax expenditures. Representatives of states with the highest levels
of income and/or taxation fight hard to retain this deduction, because it benefits their constituents the most. Once enacted, provisions such as these that make little or no sense are difficult to
repeal, especially if repeal is to occur rapidly.
Consider now the outcry that was heard against replacing the
accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) enacted under ERTA
with the Treasury I proposal for a real cost recovery system
(RCRS). RCRS is a system of indexed depreciation allowances
designed to reflect economic depreciation. 64 Had RCRS been
proposed in 1981, the business community would probably have
hastened to support it. The United States had just gone through
an extended period of high inflation that eroded the value of depreciation allowances based on historical costs. 6 5 RCRS would
have protected future depreciation allowances from inflation and
would have been substantially more advantageous than the depreciation allowances under the then-current law. Of course, by
ineligible for aid. So will any family whose housing payments for mortgage interest plus certain other payments are less than $3,400.
The payments will begin at as little as 11% of qualifying expenditures by single persons with incomes of less than $3,300, and four-person families with incomes of less than $7,400. The maximum subsidy
of 50% of qualifying expenditures will be available only to single persons with incomes of more than $85,000 and to four-person families
with incomes of more than $166,400.
The new program will be administered in a novel way. Instead of
processing applications for assistance, the government will pay funds
automatically to anyone who fills out a simple form. The government
intends to audit only about 2% of all such forms for accuracy and honesty. "It sure keeps down the size of the bureaucracy," one skeptical
critic quipped.
When asked whether it was true that some upper income families
might receive $10,000 per year or more under the program, while some
lower income families receive nothing, the bill's sponsors acknowledged that such an outcome was anticipated. Despite a study by the
Congressional Budget Office showing that more than half of the subsidies under this homeownership-promotion program would accrue to
households with incomes of $50,000 per year or more and virtually
none to households with incomes of $ 10,000 per year or less, no one in
Congress, the current administration, or in any previous administration
could be found to criticize the plan on the record.
Id.
64. For a discussion of RCRS and its effects, see TREASURY I, supra note 2,
vol. 2, at 157-72.
65. For a discussion of some aspects of the interaction between inflation
and the United States tax system in creating pressures for the investment incentives enacted in 1981, see McLure, The Evolution of Tax Advice and the Taxation of
American Business, 2 Gov'T & POL'Y 251 (1984).
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the time Treasury I was proposed, the business community had already gained adoption of ACRS and saw no reason to give it up
once inflation had subsided. While at high rates of inflation
RCRS is more generous than ACRS, it would be less generous if
66
inflation is below a rate of about five percent.
Treasury I has been attacked as inimical to economic growth
and the competitive position of American industry in international trade. Again, had Treasury I been proposed in 1981, the
arguments would have been just the opposite. Treasury I would
have stimulated economic growth by preventing the adverse effects on investment stemming from the combination of inflation
and an unindexed tax system. Moreover, this would have been
seen as helping the competitive position of American industry.
Of course, by the time Treasury I was proposed, American industry
was reeling from the adverse effects of an overvalued dollar induced by capital inflows resulting from the budget deficit and
67
high interest rates.
IV.

TREASURY

I: THE HIGH ROAD

Being relatively isolated from demands for political compromise, the authors of Treasury I had the opportunity to formulate a
set of proposals for fundamental tax reform that would closely
approximate the ideal of a comprehensive annual income tax. Because Treasury I took this high road, its advocates could speak with
fervor of its advantages in achieving horizontal equity, economic
neutrality and simplification. Although Treasury I was not without
defects, it was not as flawed as the advocates for special interests
claimed. This section describes in broad outline the most fundamental provisions of Treasury I and (where not already given) their
justification. It then describes several real defects and even more
imagined problems.
66. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 166-72. At a 5% rate of inflation,
the present value of depreciation allowances under RCRS exceeds that of ACRS
for assets in classes 1-3. Id. at 166-68. At the same rate of inflation, the allowance for assets in classes 4-7 is less under RCRS than under ACRS. Id. at 16972.
67. Those who argued for investment incentives on grounds of international competitiveness apparently overlooked a simple identity from the national
income accounts. The excess of national investment over national saving equals
the inflow of capital, that is, the excess of imports over exports. Stimulating
investment without increasing saving inevitably implies a deterioration in the
current account in international transactions.
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The Outlines of Treasury 168

As noted earlier, Treasury I proposed introduction of a comprehensive system of inflation adjustments. 6 9 The indexation of
interest income and expense would have increased incentives to
save and reduced incentives to borrow. It would also have taken
much of the wind out of tax shelters by reducing the interest expense passed on to investors. Thus, a system of inflation adjustments would have helped tax reform achieve the goals of
economic neutrality, horizontal equity and simplicity.
With both depreciation allowances and the calculation of
capital gains indexed for inflation, it was not thought necessary to
provide accelerated depreciation allowances or to exclude a portion of long-term capital gains from the tax base. As a result, the
RCRS proposed in Treasury I would have allowed deductions for
the real value of depreciation as indicated by the best available
estimates of economic depreciation. 70 Similarly, taxing real capital gains as ordinary income would have had important benefits in
simplifying the administration of and compliance with the tax system, since a substantial amount of the Internal Revenue Code is
devoted to preventing the conversion of ordinary income into
preferentially-taxed capital gains.
Treasury I contained numerous proposals to reduce or eliminate preferential treatment now accorded various industries and
sources of income. Those included elimination of percentage depreciation and expensing of intangible drilling costs in the oil and
gas industry, extension of at-risk rules to real estate, capitalization
of many expenditures incurred in multi-year production that are
now expensed, taxing large limited partnerships as corporations
and tightening the rules for interest limitations for individual taxpayers. 7 1 Together with the deceleration of depreciation al68. Time and space do not allow comprehensive examination of all the
provisions in Treasury I. Only the most fundamental reforms are outlined here.
Many others, while important in the aggregate, are probably better seen as
traditional base broadening, rather than as fundamental reform. For a list of
provisions of current law not affected by Treasury I, see TREASURY I, supra note 2,
vol. 2, at 147.
69. For a discussion of the Treasury I proposals in this area, see supra notes
22-28 and accompanying text.
70. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 152-72. For the basis of the
estimates of economic depreciation underlying the RCRS proposal, see Hulten
& Wykoff, The Measurement of Economic Depredation, in DEPRECIATION, INFLATION,
AND THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 81 (C. Hulten ed. 1981).
71. For a discussion of the elimination of percentage depletion and expensing of intangible drilling costs, see TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 229-33.
For a discussion of the extension of at-risk sales to real estate, see id. vol. 2 at
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lowances, elimination of the investment tax credit, the taxation of
real capital gains as ordinary income and interest indexing, these
(and similar) provisions would have virtually eliminated opportunities for profitable corporations to pay little or no tax and for
high-income individuals to shelter income. 72 As a result, Treasury
I suggested that if the changes it proposed were enacted, both the
73
corporate and individual minimum taxes should be eliminated.
In order to prevent double taxation of corporate source equity income and the problems it produces, Treasury I proposed
that corporations should receive a deduction for one-half of dividends paid.7" Together with the indexing of interest income and
expense, the deduction for dividends paid would help to redress
the preference given by current law for the use of debt finance,
rather than equity.
Treasury I also proposed that many sources and uses of personal income that are now accorded preferential treatment be
taxed more fully. Most notable among these are the proposals to
eliminate the exclusion for most employee fringe benefits and the
deduction for state and local taxes. 75 Reduction of the tax advantages of employee fringe benefits is required for both horizontal
334-35. For a discussion of the capitalization of expenditures in multi-year production, see id. vol. 2, at 202-11. For a discussion of taxing large limited partnerships as corporations, see id. vol. 2, at 146-50.
72. For a discussion of how such provisions are combined to allow highincome individuals to shelter income from tax, see JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXA-

98th Cong., 2d Sess., PROPOSALS RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS AND OTHER
TAX-MOTIVATED TRANSACTIONS (1984).
73. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 112, 130.
TION,

74. Id. vol. 1, at 118-19; id. vol. 2, at 134-44. In the formulation of Treasury
I, consideration was given to a novel approach under which corporations would

be allowed a deduction only for dividends paid on newly issued stock. In addition, it would be necessary to have a substantial tax on non-dividend distributions, in order to prevent firms from replacing old stock with new. This
proposal, which was an elaboration of one previously analyzed by the reporter

for the American Law Institute, would have had all the allocative advantages of
dividend relief for all shares, but would have provided few windfall gains and
would have been substantially less expensive. See A.L.I., SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON CORPORATE DisTRIBUTIONS (1982). For discussions of the ALI proposal, see Andrews, Tax
Neutrality Between Equity Capitaland Debt, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1057, 1066-68 (1984);
Warren, The Relations and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94
HARV. L. REV. 717, 753-72 (1981). For a further discussion of corporate deductions for dividends paid, see MCLURE, supra note 31, at 125-28; McLure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Tax Reform
Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 532, 554-55 (1975).
75. For a discussion of the elimination of most employee fringe benefits,
see TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 20-50. For a discussion of the elimination
of the deduction for state and local taxes, see id. vol. 1, at 78-81; id. vol. 2, at 62-

68.
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fairness and economic neutrality. 76 The existing exclusion of
most fringe benefits provides an unfair advantage to those who
are paid this form of compensation. Moreover, it encourages
over-consumption of goods and services that can be provided as
tax-exempt fringe benefits, relative to goods and services that
cannot be provided as tax-exempt fringe benefits. Similar concerns motivated the proposal to eliminate the deduction for state
and local taxes. 77 The deduction encourages over-expansion of
state and local services. Furthermore, taxpayers in high-tax states
benefit relatively more than those in low-tax states.
Treasury I also proposed substantial reductions in marginal
tax rates of individuals-on average roughly 20%.78 High-income taxpayers would receive the largest reduction because they
benefit the most from preferential provisions in the current law.
Tax liabilities for families with incomes above $20,000 would
be cut by a relatively uniform fraction. Whereas the average cut
for all families would be 8.5%, the reductions for various income
categories above $30,000 fell within the relatively narrow range
of 6.4% to 9.30.79 As indicated earlier, these reductions in individual taxes were to be financed by increases in taxes on
corporations.
Since 1979, when the personal exemptions and zero-bracket
amounts (ZBA's) were last changed, there has been a substantial
amount of inflation. As a result, the tax-free amounts represented by exemptions and the ZBA have deteriorated substantially in real terms. The 1981 tax cuts did not reverse this trend,
although the indexing enacted in 1981, to become effective in
1985, will prevent its continuation.8 0 In order to restore approximate equality between the threshold level at which income tax liability begins and the official poverty level, Treasury I contained a
TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 1, at 73-74; id. vol. 2, at 20-50.
77. See id. vol. 1, at 78-81; id. vol. 2, at 62-68.
78. See id. vol. 1, at 47.

76. See

79. Id.

80. Inflation had, in effect, shifted the curve relating marginal tax rates (on
the vertical axis) to levels of real income (on the horizontal axis) to the left. The
1981 act, by shifting the curve downward, compensated (or more than compensated) taxpayers with incomes above the poverty level for the effect of inflation.
However, it did not provide any benefit to those low-income households that
had been forced by inflation to pay income tax on poverty level incomes. Both
Treasury I and the President's proposals would shift the rate schedule back to the
right. It is ironic that Congressman Jack Kemp, one of the most outspoken advocates of increasing the personal exemption in the recent debate, had been one
of the authors of the 1981 rate reductions that failed to deal with the problem of
inflation-induced erosion of the personal exemption.
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substantial increase in the personal exemption and moderate in8
creases in the ZBA's. '
B.

Economic Defects of Treasury I

Treasury I contained one major economic defect and several
less important ones. These defects are discussed in this subsection. Alleged defects of Treasury I are discussed in subsection C
below.
The single most important defect of Treasury I was dictated by
political reality. President Reagan, in the aftermath of a question
and answer session with members of the National Association of
Realtors, was forced to declare the deduction for home mortgage
interest "off limits" for tax reform. 8 2 This prohibition was ultimately interpreted to mean that the inflation adjustment would
not be applied to the home mortgage deduction. 83 Besides meaning that the resulting proposals for tax reform could not be totally
fair, this artificial constraint meant that the tax system proposed
in Treasury I might actually be less neutral than current law. 84 The
unfairness of making the home-mortgage deduction a sacred cow
is easily seen. Those with home mortgages would pay less tax
than others with the same amount of real economic income.
Moreover, there would be a tremendous incentive for all homeowners to borrow the equity on homes in order to benefit from
tax arbitrage: investing the proceeds from higher mortgages in
debt obligations in order to benefit from the asymmetric tax treatment of deductions for interest on mortgage debt (not indexed)
and income from interest bearing securities (indexed). The tax
advantages of home ownership could easily induce such over-investment in owner-occupied housing that it would totally offset
the benefits from achieving a more level playing field in other
dimensions.
Another inappropriate provision in Treasury I was retention
of the exclusion of interest income on state and local securities.
Though this exclusion creates well-known inequities and ineffiTREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 5-8.
82. Remarks at the National Association of Realtors Midyear Meeting, 20

81. See

COMP. PRES.

WEEKLY

Doc. 691 (May 10, 1984).

83. For a further discussion of this interpretation and its implications, see
McLure, supra note 25, at 227-28.
84. For economic analysis indicating that this is the case, see FULLERTON,
THE INDEXATION OF INTEREST, DEPRECIATION, AND CAPITAL GAINS: A MODEL OF
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES

(American Enterprises Institute Working Paper No. 5,

June 1985); HENDERSHOTr,
TION (August 1985).

TAX REFORM, INTEREST RATES AND CAPITAL ALLOCA-
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ciencies, for political reasons its elimination was not proposed. 8 5
Given the proposal to eliminate the deduction for state and local
taxes and the exclusion for interest on state and local securities
issued for non-governmental purposes, it did not seem worthwhile also to propose repeal of the exclusion for interest on securities issued for governmental purposes.
C. Alleged Defects of Treasury

186

The proposal to decelerate depreciation allowances and
eliminate the investment tax credit ("ITC") created a split among
the business community. Most capital-intensive industries fought
hard against the elimination of these investment incentives by
forecasting the imminent "deindustrialization" of America and
the loss of international competitiveness. Because these industries use investment incentives and other provisions to substantially reduce their tax liability, if not to eliminate it altogether,
they would have gladly accepted higher statutory tax rates in exchange for retention of the ITC and accelerated depreciation. On
the other hand, there are many firms and entire industries, including some that make heavy capital investments, that pay relatively high effective tax rates. These corporations were willing to
give up the investment incentives in order to achieve the substantial rate reductions proposed in Treasury I.
Many academic economists sided with advocates of investment incentives; some would clearly accept higher statutory rates
to finance more generous investment incentives. This reflects
several interesting shifts in viewpoint over the past several decades. After all, economists, like others, have traditionally decried the imposition of high marginal tax rates because of the
distortions of economic decision-making and the disincentives
they create.
Academic support for investment incentives can probably be
traced to two sources. The first is the relatively recent development of a methodology for assessing how combinations of tax
provisions affect the "cost of capital" and so-called ex ante marginal effective tax rates. Interest in this approach has "crowded
out" concern over other types of distortions, including those that
85. For a standard description of the inequities and distortions caused by
the exclusion of interest on state and local securities, see Ackerman & Ott, An
Analysis of the Revenue Effects of ProposedSubstitutes for Tax Exemption of State and Local
Bonds, 23 NAT'L TAX. J. 397 (1970).
86. This section concentrates on specious attacks mounted against the most
fundamental provisions for reform proposed in Treasury I.
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result from high statutory tax rates. Second, as mentioned above,
academic interest in consumption-based taxation has been growing. There may be a tendency to believe that any provision that
reduces the taxation of investment would represent a desirable
move toward a consumption-based system.
There are at least two problems with this rather naive viewpoint. First, one cannot simply "mix and match" expensing (or
even rapidly accelerated depreciation) from the tax on consumed
income with the interest deductions from the income tax. Any
such attempt cannot be made without creating negative effective
tax rates on debt-financed investments, economic distortions that
would not exist in either pure system, opportunities for tax shelters and substantial complexity. To achieve neutrality, equity and
simplicity, one must choose either the income or consumption
system and adopt it in full. Second, as noted above, the primary
advantage of a tax on consumed income is its simplicity of compliance and administration, particularly the elimination of problems
involving inflation-adjustment and the time value of money. Simply including investment incentives-whether indexed or not-in
a tax system based on nominal income would not achieve simplification; it creates complexity.
The Treasury I proposals for indexing and the related provisions for economic depreciation and taxation of real capital gains
as ordinary income were also attacked on a number of other
grounds, most of which were fallacious. First, there was a tendency to focus on revenue effects during the 1986-1990 period.
This put the proposal to switch from ACRS to RCRS in quite a
negative light. ACRS can reasonably be seen as an ad hoc attempt to compensate for inflation by allowing depreciation to be
taken more rapidly than assets actually lose value. RCRS, on the
other hand, explicitly allows for inflation, so that depreciation allowances track economic depreciation more accurately. In present value terms, RCRS is actually as generous as ACRS for most
types of investment unless the inflation rate lies below 5%.87 The
deceleration of depreciation allowances during the period of transition from the "front-loaded" ACRS to RCRS would have produced a temporary bulge in corporate tax revenues during the
1986-1990 period.8 8 Business opponents of the shift from ACRS
87. For further discussion of RCRS and ACRS, see supra note 66.
88. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 1, at 44-45. Thus, corporate receipts
in 1990 would be 36.5% higher than under current law. By comparison, if the
Treasury I proposals were fully phased in, corporate receipts would be only about

24% higher. See id.
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to RCRS concentrated on these five-year revenue figures rather
than long-run revenue estimates or on the present value of real
depreciation allowances.
The argument that the real present value of depreciation allowances would be as great under RCRS as under ACRS carried
less weight with many business executives than might have been
expected. This can probably be traced to a variety of sources.
First, some simply did not understand the purpose of indexing,
which was to prevent the measurement of real income from being
distorted by inflation.8 9 Second, even those who clearly understood the economics of RCRS did not necessarily prefer it to
ACRS. This suggests that economists' models that focus attention on real present values and exclude consideration of up-front
cash flow may fail to capture real-world decision making.
If business was concerned about the increase in its tax liabilities during 1986-1990 period, others were equally concerned that
indexing of depreciation allowances would create a revenue "time
bomb" that would explode sometime beyond 1990. That is, they
feared that if inflation accelerated, depreciation allowances would
increase accordingly and revenues would be lower than under an
unindexed system. 90 This attribute of an indexed system is undoubtedly correct. But it should be seen as an advantage of indexing rather than a disadvantage, since the mirror image of
lower government revenues is less improper taxation of fictitious
business income.
As indicated above, the Treasury I proposal for interest indexing was known to be imperfect. Even so, it was thought to be a
substantial improvement over current law. The inadequacies of
Treasury I concerning the treatment of financial institutions could
89. In private conversations with the author, several business representatives have complained that the provisions for inflation adjustment increase uncertainty about the nominal value of deductions for interest expense. Of course,
the basic purpose of these proposals was to reduce the uncertainty of effective
marginal tax rates, calculated on the basis of real economic income.
90. Prospects for long-run budgetary balance were even worse under the
system of "present value expensing" proposed in one of the later versions of the
Kemp-Kasten proposal. See H.R. 777, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 131 GONG. REC.
E288-91 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1985). Rather than including a proposal for expensing, which clearly would have entailed an enormous and unacceptable loss of
revenues in the early years, Kemp and Kasten proposed a "back-loaded" system
of indexed depreciation allowances that would equal expensing in present value
but involve relatively minor revenue cost in early years. (This was achieved by
allowing deductions for more than the cost of assets.) As structured, the KempKasten proposal would entail an explosion of depreciation allowances just after
the 1986-90 period, regardless of the rate of inflation.
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have been repaired, with some resulting complications. 9' However, the real opposition to interest indexing came from three
other directions. First, because indexing would apply to the interest on the national debt, for which there is no offset on the
deduction side, a loss in tax revenues would result. Nonetheless,
indexing probably would have reduced interest rates significantly-by as much as two percentage points. 9 2 The savings on
interest on the national debt resulting from this reduction could
easily have exceeded the reduction in tax revenues caused by indexing. However, this was not factored into the calculation of
revenue neutrality.
Second, interest indexing would have taken much of the attraction out of investment in real estate, which is generally heavily
reliant on debt finance. Moreover, investments in tax shelters,
which are based on the tax advantages of debt finance, would be
less attractive to high income taxpayers who take advantage of
shelters to reduce or eliminate their tax liability.
Third, under the transition rules of Treasury I, indexing
would become effective in 1988 and would be applied to loans
outstanding at that time. This unreasonable transition provision
would have hit public utilities especially hard because they rely
heavily on debt financing and had recently undertaken large capital investments.
The proposal in Treasury I to tax real capital gains as ordinary
income was attacked from two directions.9 3 One line of attack
focused upon the 75% increase in statutory tax rates applied to
taxable gains. Whether through ignorance or subterfuge, critics
of the proposal denied the substantial benefits of indexing. At
inflation rates approximating those experienced in recent years,
taxation of real capital gains as ordinary income is actually more
generous than taxation of only 40% of nominal gains, except in
4
the case of truly spectacular gains.9
91. More problematical was the failure of the proposal for indexing to apply to home mortgage interest, or even to require netting of mortgage deductions against interest income. While it might have been possible to provide for
netting, thereby eliminating the most egregious cases of tax arbitrage, the overallocation of capital to owner occupied housing could not have been eliminated
without directly facing the political necessity to eliminate (or at least substantially reduce) the deduction for home mortgage interest.
92. The amount by which interest rates would drop would depend on the
degree of international mobility of capital, an issue about which economists are
divided.
93. For a discussion of the proposal to tax real capital gains, as ordinary
income, see TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 178-88.
94. See id. vol. 1, at 101-05.
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Those concerned with entrepreneurship and venture capital
investment took little solace from this argument. They expressed
concern that the proposed provisions would not be generous
enough to provide adequate incentives for invention, innovation,
and the investment of venture capital that brings such activities to
fruition. Essentially, the argument was that many entrepreneurs
who begin successful new ventures have little basis in their companies. They also argued that venture capitalists have relatively
little basis in investments that are highly successful. Thus, compared with the substantial increase in the maximum statutory rate
from the current 20% to the proposed 35%, inflation adjustment
is of little benefit to either of these groups. Those who were concerned about this problem took little comfort from the fact that
the portfolios of most venture capital investors are sufficiently diversified that historical rates of return on them vary little from
those of more mundane investment portfolios. Nor could these
fears be allayed by suggestions that provisions for deduction of
losses could be liberalized. 9 5 The conventional wisdom among
advocates of preferential tax treatment of capital gains (though
not among economists) is that both entrepreneurs and venture
capital investors are driven by the attraction of truly spectacular
gains and would take little notice of provisions for more complete
loss offset.
The proposal to tax most employee fringe benefits is arguably one of the most important provisions of Treasury J.96 Yet, it
was attacked as undermining the foundation for private health
care in America. The argument was that if employer-provided
health insurance did not remain entirely tax free, a system of national health insurance would result. Of course, the reality was
that Treasury I would have only taxed health benefits to the extent
that they exceeded a quite generous amount. Substantial tax in97
centives for private health care would have remained intact.
The proposal to end the deduction for state and local taxes
precipitated a split along state lines. Public figures from high-tax
states protested vigorously against the proposal. Arguments employed included extraordinary redistributional activities of high95. A standard result in the economics of taxation is that risk taking may be
greater in the presence of taxation than in its absence (or with higher rates of
taxation than with lower rates), provided losses can be fully deducted against
ordinary income. A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, supra note 13, at 97-112.
96. For a discussion of the proposal to tax employee fringe benefits, see
TREASURY I, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 20-50.
97. See id. vol. 2, at 23-28.
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tax states and spillovers between jurisdictions, as well as a variety
of less compelling but emotional arguments. Those from low-tax
states, which on average would have benefitted from the repeal of
this deduction in a revenue-neutral context, were generally not
vocal in their support for the provision. Indeed, there were some
representatives of low-tax states who actively opposed it.98
The proposal for a deduction of 50% of dividends paid
would have eliminated an important source of inequity and distortion from the tax code. However, this provision would result
in a substantial loss of revenue. Thus, the proposal for dividend
relief was vulnerable from the start. Many corporations would
have gladly traded it for retention of the ITC provided by the
investment tax credit and ACRS. The proposal for dividend relief
received only lukewarm support from those in the corporate community who would have benefitted the most from it.
V.

DOWNHILL TO

H.R. 3838

Concerns and complaints such as those described in the previous sections had a devastating effect on tax reform as the process moved to the formulation of the President's proposals and
passage of H.R. 3838. This brief section summarizes and evaluates some of the most important changes made between Treasury I
and H.R. 3838. For convenience, the discussion proceeds in two
stages: the "slippage" in the President's proposals and the further compromise in reaching H.R. 3838. As before, we concentrate on the proposals for truly fundamental changes in the tax
code.
A.

The President's Proposals

Indexing of interest income and expense was dropped from
the President's proposals. Although inventory indexing was originally retained, it was soon sacrificed on the altar of revenue neutrality. The dividend deduction was reduced from 50% to 10%
for the same reason. 99 Indexing was retained for depreciation al98. One cannot escape the impression that many public officials from lowtax jurisdictions, whose constituents would benefit from repeal of the deduction,
opposed repeal because their own jobs would be made more difficult if taxpayers in their jurisdictions could not claim the deduction. Of course, employees of
state and local governments predictably opposed repeal, arguing that repeal
would lead to various types of disaster. For a recent analysis of the "tax competition" argument for retaining the deductions for state and local taxes, see
McLure, Tax Competition: Is What's Good for the Private Goose Also Good for the Public
Gander? 34 NAT'L TAXJ. 341 (1986).
99. See President's Tax Proposals,supra note 12, at 122-23.
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lowances, but these allowances were accelerated in the interest of
stimulating capital formation.' 0 0 The current-law approach to the
taxation of capital gains was retained in response to the pleas of
those concerned about entrepreneurship and venture capital. t 0
The expensing of intangible drilling costs in the oil and gas industry was retained for political reasons, though ostensibly on the
02
grounds of national security.'
The President proposed eliminating the deduction for state
and local taxes.10 3 Without this reform, there would not has been
enough revenue to meet the targets for rate reduction. On the
other hand, the taxation of most employee fringe benefits was excluded from the President's proposal, presumably because of a
deal with Bob Packwood, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, who thinks fringe benefits should not be taxed. 0 4 The
quid pro quo in such a deal has never been clearly identified. It
may have been merely Packwood's general support for tax
reform.
The President's proposals would have been an improvement
over current law. But since the three primary components of tax
shelters (acceleration of deductions, preferential treatment of
capital gains, and full deduction of nominal interest expenses)
survived, it was necessary to include a minimum tax on corporations and individuals in the President's proposals. In short, the
tax reform proposals officially sanctioned by President Reagan
were only a dim shadow of those submitted to him by the Treasury Department six months earlier; compared to Treasury I they
100. Id. at 138-5 1. The problem of tax shelters would have been substantially greater had advocates of expensing been more successful in their attempts
to substitute it for RCRS.
101. The President proposed that the Treasury I approach to the taxation of
capital gains be allowed as an option, beginning in 1991. See id. at 169. For
practical purposes this meant that a policy of taxing real capital gains as ordinary
income had been shelved.
102. It should be noted, however, that the minimum tax was strengthened
in important ways, particularly by reducing the "net income offset" allowed in
calculating the preference for intangible drilling and development costs. See id.
at 231-33. Under current law this offset virtually eliminates this item of
preference.
103. See id. at 62-69.
104. Whereas Treasury I would have taxed employee health benefits to the
extent that they exceeded a fairly generous cap, the President's proposal contained a ludicrous provision to tax only thefirst few dollars of such benefits. See
id. at 24-29. Such an approach has neither the equity nor the allocative advantages (in terms of reduced incentives for excessive expenditures on health care)
of the Treasury I approach.
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would be less equitable and less neutral, and would achieve less
simplification.
The approaches used by the White House in early efforts to
sell the President's proposals to the American public were decidedly different from those that had been used in the initial efforts
to popularize Treasury I. Advocates of Treasury I emphasized the
horizontal inequities of current law, the allocational advantages of
a tax system that applied uniformly and consistently to all sources
and uses of income and the simplification that would occur both
in taxpayer compliance and in economic decision-making.
Rather than taking this high road and arguing for tax reform
on the basis of sound principles, the White House speech writers
chose to make an emotive appeal to greed and a presumed widespread dislike for the Internal Revenue Service. 10 5 The implied
suggestion that virtually everyone would get a tax cut played directly into the hands of those who could point out numerous examples of sympathetic taxpayers who would pay more taxes under
the President's proposals than under current law. With so many
sources and uses of income remaining tax-preferred under the
President's proposals, it was difficult to argue persuasively that
economic neutrality was an important objective. The retention of
a minimum tax on both individuals and corporations belied the
claims that simplicity would be achieved. The transparency of the
political compromises in the President's proposals, in such areas
as fringe benefits and the tax treatment of oil and gas, made it
clear that this was to be political business as usual, rather than a
legitimate attempt to rationalize the United States tax system.
B.

H.R. 3838

The House bill reflects further departures from the ideal system of Treasury I. Indexing remains only for depreciation-and
only for one-half of inflation in excess of 5%.106 A deduction for
10% of dividends paid would be phased in over ten years. 10 7
Fringe benefits would remain virtually exempt from tax, and state
and local taxes would remain fully deductible. Despite substantial
105. These themes can be seen clearly in President Reagan's May 29, 1985
message in which he submitted his tax reform proposals to the Congress. President's Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation, 21 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 707 (May 29, 1985). These themes have been repeated in many
other speeches on tax reform.
106. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 5, at 154-55.
107. Id. at 234-42.
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base broadening, minimum taxes would still be deemed
necessary.
In short, while H.R. 3838 contains many worthwhile provisions, it achieves few of the objectives of Treasury I. Substantial
distortions and inequities will remain and little significant simplification will have been achieved. Indeed, H.R. 3838 would add to
complexity in several areas. The rate structure of H.R. 3838 appears at first glance to resemble that of Treasury I and the President's proposals with the addition of 38% rate for taxable income
in excess of $100,000. In fact, H.R. 3838 contains substantially
less of a rate reduction because the 25% and 35% rates begin at
substantially lower levels of taxable income.' 0 8
VI.

ASSESSMENT

Treasury I contained 408 pages of general explanations, the
detailed descriptions of current law, reasons for change, proposed changes and analysis.1 0 9 Some of these proposals involved
fundamental changes in the structure of the United States income
tax. Inflation adjustment of interest income and expense-with
concomitant changes in depreciation allowances and the tax treatment of real capital gains-clearly falls in this category, as does
the proposal for deduction of 50% of dividends paid by corporations. The proposals to end itemized deductions for all state and
local taxes and to tax most forms of employee fringe benefits are
also fundamental. The reductions in marginal tax rates of individuals and corporations to levels not seen for many years also
constituted a fundamental change. By comparison, the increase
in the personal exemption and ZBA merely continued a tradition
made necessary by the prior failure to index those amounts for
inflation. Taken individually, few of the other provisions constituted fundamental reform. But taken together, these provisions-in combination with those for RCRS, taxation of real
capital gains as ordinary income, interest indexing, etc.-would
have constituted truly fundamental reform, as indicated by the
Treasury I proposal to eliminate the minimum taxes.
108. On the other hand, the definition of income in H.R. 3838 is substantially less inclusive than under Treasury I and the President's proposals. For a

comparison of marginal tax rates under current law and H.R. 3838, see Sunley,
Reduction in Marginal Tax Rates for Individuals, 30 TAx NOTES 447 (1986). For a
comparison of marginal tax rates under current law and the Senate Finance
Committee proposal, see MAKIN, ORNSTEIN & STEUERLE, THE ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS OF TAX REFORM
109. See TREASURY I,

(1986).
supra note 2, vol. 2.
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Virtually all of the fundamental reforms proposed in Treasury
I are absent from H.R. 3838 or present only in much attenuated
forms. For example, H.R. 3838 contains a slow phase-in of a
small deduction for dividends paid and limits the inflation adjustment of depreciation allowances to one-half of the excess of inflation over 5%. Thus, H.R. 3838 is appropriately characterized as
Democratic base broadening in the 1969 and 1976 tradition and
is more accurately described as "tax overhaul" than as tax reform.
Some of the reforms of Treasury I may be salvaged in the Senate in
order to finance liberalization of depreciation allowances. Some
state and local taxes and fringe benefits have been mentioned in
this regard. But no matter what happens, the result will not approach the comprehensiveness or the economic integrity of Treasury I. Nor will it deliver the equity, neutrality and simplification of
that proposal.
POSTSCRIPT: THE SENATE BILL

In the early hours of the morning of May 7, 1986, the Senate
Finance Committee voted unanimously in favor of a radical tax
reform bill that would virtually eliminate tax shelters and lower
marginal tax rates. 1 10 Seven weeks later, the full Senate voted
ninety-seven to three for a bill that did not differ significantly
from the Finance Committee bill. Even though differences between the House and Senate bills must be resolved in conference
before being presented to President Reagan for his signature,
most observers agree that such resolution will occur and that by
the end of the year the United States will have a vastly improved
income tax.
This turn of events is widely hailed as a miracle, in light of
the way special interests had so recently been able to subvert the
tax reform process in the Senate Finance Committee. In a speech
on May 2, less than a week before the Finance Committee's "conversion," the present author had the following to say:
The Senate Finance Committee seems to be hellbent on proving that democracy does not work. True
tax reform would entail eliminating or curtailing egregious tax preferences that benefit the few, in order to
lower marginal tax rates on the many, and thereby improve the fairness, neutrality, and simplicity of the system. But in response to pressure from representatives of
110. S.

REP.

No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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special interests, the Senate Finance Committee has
voted to preserve tax preferences that are unfair, that
distort economic decision-making, and that complicate
the tax system for everyone. They have reduced marginal income tax rates, but would use highly regressive and
horizontally inequitable excise taxes to offset much of
the revenue loss.
Two natural questions to ask about the Senate bill are: 1) is
this really fundamental tax reform and 2) why and how did the
miraculous change occur? Though these questions (and others)
cannot be answered in detail, this postscript does offer brief comments on both.
A.

Is it Fundamental Tax Reform?

The various provisions of the Senate bill were "cobbled together" in an attempt to gain some objectives of tax reform, while
preserving politically sensitive preferences. As a result, the bill
lacks the coherence of Treasury I, and falls short of realizing the
full potential of tax reform for fairness, neutrality and simplicity.
The Senate bill is characterized by two basic features: substantial rate reduction and sharp curtailment of opportunities for
tax shelters. In and of themselves, these are important improvements. Curtailment of tax shelters will increase the horizontal equity and neutrality of the tax system and reduce its complexity
and the perception of unfairness by reducing the ability to avoid
taxes by investing in tax-favored activities. Lower rates will reduce incentives for tax-motivated behavior of all kinds, as well as
reducing disincentives and horizontal inequities. The Senate bill
improves the tax system in few other fundamental ways.
That this is true can be seen by considering briefly the most
important Treasury I reforms, described in Section IV above.
Under the Senate bill, inflation should continue to erode the
value of depreciation allowances based on the historical nominal
cost of assets and overstate real interest income and expense.
Even worse, nominal capital gains would be taxed as ordinary income, without the benefit of inflation adjustment, and dividends
would continue to be taxed twice. While tax shelters would be
considerably curtailed, many of the preferences that constitute
the basic ingredients of shelters would be continued. Indeed, oil
and gas is explicitly excluded from the anti-shelter provisions.
Little is done to rationalize the tax treatment of individuals.
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All mortgage interest on as many as two homes would be deductible, as would most state and local taxes. Contributions to individual retirement accounts (IRAs) would no longer be deductible for
all taxpayers, but employee health benefits provided by employers would continue to be tax exempt. In short, the Senate has
passed a tax shelter-rate reduction bill, not fundamental tax
reform.
B.

How Did It Happen?

In gaining the unanimous approval of the Senate Finance
Committee bill (and the nearly unanimous vote of the Senate)
Senator Packwood used exactly the tactic envisaged in the preparation of Treasury I. That is, he presented for an "up or down"
vote a package that was sufficiently attractive to be acceptable to
all (or almost all) members, even though it contained many provisions that individual senators disliked. In the Senate, virtually all
amendments to the Finance Committee bill were rejected on the
grounds that acceptance of any one might open the floodgates for
others.
The process in the Finance Committee differed from that
hoped for in the preparation of Treasury I in one important way.
Favors were granted to some Senators in order to gain their support for the tax reform package. These included preferential
treatment for oil and gas, for timber and for health benefits, as
well as continuation of such popular provisions as the deduction
for most state and local taxes. As a result, there are obvious and
unfortunate holes in the fabric of tax reform as it has emerged
from the Senate, as well as in the House bill.
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